It is a challenge to identify the "now." In presenting this paper, I have a now that is already gone by the time the paper is published. The now is always in flux. Any intellectual historian who takes a presentist approach would have to establish a now in the present as well as one at the historical moments of interest. For the purposes of developing my argument here, I stipulate that the now of the present began on 24 February 2022 and is still ongoing, at the time of writing this paper. This means I start from the beginning of the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine (without forgetting that the war started indeed after the ousting of the then-president Viktor Yanukovych back in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea and the fighting in Donbas that has continued ever since). In this essay, the now of the present will be approached through the work of philosophers who, at two earlier historical moments, discussed the now they were witnessing and responding to.
Thus, I return to the period after the Second World War and the years after the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe, as these were historical moments that defined Europe. This said, I argue that the Russian incursion into Ukraine presents Europeans with another moment that defines Europe. At stake are ideas pertaining to the future of Europe and the identity of being European.
Given the circumstance that I have presented this material in an environment of Karl Jaspers scholarship, it is reasonable to depart from Jaspers' reflections on Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, the National Socialist rule of his native Germany, and the United States' detonating of two atomic bombs in Japan. Jaspers' speech from 1946 demonstrates his Europeanist turn. During the inter-war period, José Ortega y Gasset had already established himself as an important representative of the European idea. Being of the same generation as Jaspers, he continued to discuss Europe's past, present, and future. I will use a speech Ortega delivered in 1953, when European integration was on the agenda. Jacques Derrida is included here with a speech from 1990, held after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Said speech was followed by his further pleadings for Europeanisation and European identity. Taken together, the three philosophers were highly respected and emerged as leading European and Europeanist public intellectuals.
Hence, I shall start by examining the visions of Europe, of its identity and future, as expressed in these three speeches. Thereafter, some of the themes raised will be linked to the discourse on the idea of Europe, particularly on Europe post 24 February 2022, guided by the aim of presenting a couple of positions on Europeanness in the present day.
In September 1946, Jaspers participated as one of the nine keynote speakers at the inaugural meeting of the congress Rencontres Internationales de Genève; its opening lecture was given by Julien Benda. Nearly fifty participants, including Georges Bernanos, Francesco Flora, Jeanne Hersch, George Lukács, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Stephen Spender, Jean Starobinski and Jean Wahl, discussed what has remained of the European spirit and what hopes could still be extracted from it. Jaspers' presentation was published in the French proceedings and as a German booklet entitled Europa der Gegenwart (1947). Soon translated into other languages, it was also a sign of his new role as an important thinker of Europe's future. In doing this, he moved easily between philosophy and contemporary politics and drew on his conceptual framework, which he had developed over the past four decades, to address the extremely troubling issues of the day.
Jaspers clearly admired Europe's cultural achievements, as
an immeasurable wealth of the spirit, of morals, and of faith. [ES 35]
However, Europe had declined in importance and had to accept its present condition and role in the new world order. For Jaspers, the diagnosis of Europe after the Second World War was clear: Europe had lost its position of strength relative to the rest of the world. He identified the United States and the Soviet Union as the two main world powers, with Europe squeezed in between them.
Unsurprisingly, he claimed that the European spirit was also found in America and Russia, yet he underlined that these countries were not a part of Europe. He elaborated this point thus:
America, although its population comes from European nations, became politically separated from Europe. Russia is near us in space and far in spirit, but has for us, in virtue of the strangeness and depth of the Russian spirit, a heightened fascination. [ES 46]
When expanding on what defined Europe, Jaspers stressed life replete with polarities, offering a long list of examples: revolution versus conservatism, Good as an authority versus the Enlightenment, the public versus the intimate, church versus state, nation versus empire, Roman versus German, worldly versus transcendent, and science versus faith. For Europeans, this implied that they had freedom within these polarities. In addition, he claimed that this meant that truth was always in flux, as each conclusion created its own insufficiency.
To define European heritage, he identified a specific European development since the sixteenth century, namely universal science and technology, which set Europe on a path separate from the high cultures of China and India. Yet he could identify European thinking all the way back to the Bible and Homer. In European history, from Athens onwards, he saw opposition to dictators led by emancipatory movements that, starting in the sixteenth century, were associated with strivings for universal knowledge in science and history. Hence, he associated freedom with historical awareness and the desire for knowledge.
Europe's old prerogative, Jaspers told his readers, came with Christianity and was linked to the science and technology developed uniquely in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards. Science was understood as the means to attain universal knowledge. European science was thus limitless, always seeking greater knowledge whilst maintaining a self-critical posture.
Europeans were also marked by a will to history, implying that, in contrast to people of other cultures, they understood history as a meaningful series of events that are moving in a certain direction, tending toward political freedom. The European spirit included a growing consciousness of history as never coming to an end. Jaspers concluded that
only Europe has a science of universal history and a philosophy of history. [ES 41]
Challenged by America and Russia and exhausted after the wars, Europe could no longer consider itself exceptional in the world. Therefore, it was logical that Jaspers foresaw a federation of states as the only way for Europe to live in the future.
Jaspers saw a need to take responsibility for the future and for the new world order that emerged from the wars Europe had ignited. He recommended that Europe submit to international law and stressed the importance of upholding representative democracy in it, although from the early 1930s onwards, he had some doubts about the politicians in charge. In 1946, he called for openness in politics and for politicians to change and not adhere to ideological worldviews. Clearly, as much as he rejected the National Socialist regime, he took a firm anti-communist stand.
Jaspers implored the Europeans to transcend themselves, to change their way of thinking, and to realize Europe's own responsibility to enact this transcendence. He proclaimed:
Thus the courage of us Europeans may be strengthened by this thought, that what Europe has produced must be overcome in the spirit by Europe itself. [ES 49]
Europe had a Janus face, having created a world community but also world wars and nuclear weapons. Europe has been the driving force behind science and technology, and its spirit must bring essential measures to reshape the world's order. Economically, this entailed fairness, and politically, it entailed a peaceful order that stood against violence and terror. Jaspers both encouraged and cautioned when he declares:
What here in the flux of things is committed and omitted is responsible for the future of Europe. [ES 50-1]
Obviously, Jaspers' idea of European responsibility was associated with the notions of European exceptionalism and of being a role model for the world. Both of them have been main themes in the history of the European idea. Jaspers stressed that expanding the European idea into an idea of humanity could be fundamental to a new world order. One may justifiably ask whether this is a Eurocentric move. The answer is "Yes," if Eurocentrism solely implies exceptionalism. However, after the Second World War and in opposition to Nazi ideology and previous German nationalism and imperial ambitions, Jaspers built on his interest in non-European cultural accomplishments, especially Chinese and Indian philosophy, and proposed the equality of cultures and their right not to be dominated. In Europa der Gegenwart, Jaspers' conception of Europe was based on an idea of equality between cultures and states, in the sense that no one culture should rule over the others. Just as no nation within Europe should rule over its neighbors, Europe should not rule the world either, nor should so the United States or the Russian Federation (ES 52-3).
According to Jaspers, the idea of European responsibility transcended Europe and extends to the world, yet not with the aim of ruling it. In his definition, European responsibility redefined European exceptionalism, setting it apart from the idea of European countries dominating their neighboring countries as well as from Europe dominating its neighbors.
When José Ortega y Gasset gave a talk on the idea of Europe, he began by relating it to contemporary political issues, just as Jaspers had done. The speech was delivered in Munich to the Federation of German Industries in late September 1953, seven years after Jaspers' speech in Geneva and well after the initiation of the European integration into the Coal and Steel Treaty signed in 1951, yet before the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Ortega y Gasset stated from the outset that the countries of Europe could not continue to exist each standing alone, but instead must act together as a united Europe. For this, they needed common ground that went deeper than solving technical problems together, beyond a social contract and legal arrangements, and that could only be an awareness of their shared culture. Accordingly, he began by exploring what Europe had been in history. Like Jaspers, he stressed the tensions at work in conceptions of Europe. He stated that Europe consisted of different peoples,
both among them and beyond them, a shared reservoir of ideas, forms, and enthusiasms was created.
Ortega y Gasset stressed that the uniqueness of Europe's individual peoples laid in their common awareness, in the sense that they triggered one another—each emerging new common principle triggered the emergence of differences. The idea of a universal Christianity led to the establishment of national churches; the eighteenth century's conception of a single constitution for all peoples generated notions of different nationalities, and so on. The geographical space of Europe had been marked by both peaceful cohabitation and war. Despite the differences among Europe's peoples, he claimed that common European habits existed. He clarified:
Strictly speaking, I understand society to mean human beings that are living together under a certain system of customs,—for law, public opinion, and public authority are nothing if they are not customs.
Ortega y Gasset saw a duality insofar as Europeans simultaneously lived in two social spaces or societies as all the individual nations were also European nations. For example, people lived as Germans but also as Europeans. Hence, the Europeans were both Europeans and particular peoples. However, he also recognized how this balance had shifted over the centuries. While Europeanism marked the eighteenth century, particularism was the hallmark of the nineteenth and especially the first half of the twentieth century. Clearly, Ortega y Gasset upheld the argument that the time had once again come for Europeanism.
In 1953, Ortega y Gasset argued that it was a historical necessity for the European peoples to come together again and support the unity of Europe. Basically, there was no choice but to unite. He elaborated at the time:
The structure of today's economy compels our peoples, whether they like it or not, to conclude binding agreements that limit their sovereignty and subordinate them to supranational powers, amongst which Europe acts as a legal construct.
Further discussing sovereignty—a key concept in the discourse on Europe in the early 1950s, just as it is today—he argued that the European nation states were never fully sovereign. His argument was that their sovereignty was always limited by that of other states, and even during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the European states had to coexist within the Concert of Europe and the European balance of power. Moreover, he rejected the contemporary nationalism. The concept of a nation limited one's gaze to a future beyond the particularism of the past and incorporating the possibilities of European integration. Nationalism had no future, nor did the nation as a form of society that was backward-looking.
On the other hand, Ortega emphasized that a cultural awareness of European unity should not be mistaken for the making of a European state. Pessimistically, he saw particularism as Europe's enduring main trait. The nations were inwards-looking and backwards-looking. He muses acerbically:
The nations have settled in and put on their slippers.
However, according to him, there was also the awareness of a European culture, if only as a seed for the yet-to-come. For him, this awareness just needed more self-confidence to flourish. He concluded that European culture was always in the making and was a path that now needed to be taken.
Much of his talk was about recognizing a heritage of Europeanness in contrast to the recent experience of wars; it was framed by his conviction that only unification would offer a way to a desirable future. However, the Europeans of his day were marked by what he regarded as an absence of both political and cultural unity.
Originally a 1990 talk held at a conference with distinguished intellectuals on the future of Europe after the fall of communism in Central Europe, Jacques Derrida's 1991 essay L'autre cap reflected on contemporary Europe. The essay commented on the hopes and fears that accompanied the redefinition of Europe's cultural identity. Typical of commentators on Europe in this period, he declared himself a European intellectual, but not completely, as his cultural identity also included other parts, alluding to varied conceptions of identity and culture when he asks:
If, to conclude, I declared that I feel European among other things, would this be, in this very declaration, to be more or less European? Both, no doubt. [OH 83]
Hence, he found it to be necessary
to take the old name of Europe at once very seriously and cautiously, that is, to take it lightly. [OH 82]
He explicitly discussed the idea of Europe, of the modern tradition of this idea from G. W. F. Hegel to Paul Valéry, of Europe as different from other cultures, and importantly, of Europe as redefining itself
in not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not. [OH 29]
These sentiments are at the core of his plea in The Other Heading: Europe must remember what it is and keep to certain values, yet also move beyond them. Europe was something more than multiplying borders and a single authority. In contrast to Jaspers and Ortega y Gasset, he sought for something without a historical origin. To simply stake a position in a former European culture was not in his mind, and he warned that such an approach would unleash
the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism. [OH 6]
Specifically, Derrida discussed responsibility and its implication for the redefinition of Europe. For him, the answer rested on the observation that cultural identities always make double claims, namely, both self-affirmation and representation of the universal. Cultural identification might include singularity that can be "individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not" (OH 72), but also combined with claims to respond to the universal. Derrida argued that identity is associated with "the responsibility of testifying for universality" (OH 73). Against this backdrop, he related Europe to a set of duties.
These duties and responsibilities all align with European values and inspire the effort to go beyond them. These include the duty to uphold the European promises to condemn "totalitarian dogmatism that...destroyed democracy" (OH 77), to preserve the idea of a democracy that makes promises for tomorrow, to respect differences and "the universality of formal law" (OH 78), to persist in faithfulness to Enlightenment ideals and recognize their limits. In addition, this duty calls for nurturing the idea of criticism and the critical tradition but also for going beyond it "without yet compromising it" (OH 77).
However, the first duty is to remember the European promises in order to re-identify what Europe is. This implies an openness to what Europe is, but also
opening it onto that which is not, never was, and never will be Europe. [OH 77]
Europe should not isolate itself. In line with this argument and as a critique of the ideal of culturally homogeneous societies, Derrida prescribes the integration of foreigners alongside an acceptance of their otherness. He writes:
The same duty also dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity. [OH 77]
The European promises address a desire to include neighbors across cultural divides, to foster the ability to imagine responsibility for others who are different from us, and to see what we have in common beyond the obvious differences.
Promoting the duality of nations and Europe is a key theme for Jaspers and Ortega y Gasset, both historically and in the present. This means that the idea of Europe and the idea of nation are linked to each other. For a historian of the European idea, this constitutes no surprise. In the nineteenth century, pleas for national cultures and national rights were joined to Europeanness. The building of national cultures was often defended by appeals to be part of European culture, to enhance European civilization through the richness of national uniqueness. Thinking about Europe has included and still includes considering both unity and borders, both a shared community or civilization, and its parts, both unification and division. Since the early 1800s, thinking about Europe encompassed the creation of nations and the division of Europe. This is also what can now be seen in Ukraine. There is a forceful buildup of national consciousness that involves switching to speaking Ukrainian rather than Russian and emphasizing Ukrainian culture, including its literature, art, and so on. In historiography, one can see an emphasis that distinguishes Ukrainian from Russian history and that considers Russia as the oppressor and Ukraine as its victim. There is also Ukraine's determination to connect with countries in the West and adapt to European Union ideals and role models. In fact, a makeover is underway in Ukraine aimed at gaining acceptance as a Member State of the European Union. Consequently, Ukrainianisation and Ukrainian Europeanisation are developing in close connection with each other.
For Jaspers, Russia was not a European country (ES 46). Even though it partook of some elements of European culture, it was also informed through other traditions. In the present European political discourse, Russia is no longer considered part of Europe. In the history of Russia's oscillations toward and away from Europe, the present-day gap is immense. The wars in Chechnya, Georgia, and Donbas, as well as the occupation of Crimea, had not resulted in the distancing of Europe from Russia, nor had Russia's drift into authoritarian rule during the regime of Vladimir Putin. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and explicit demands to rewrite the European security order effected in the European Union and most of its member states to break bonds and establish hard borders toward the eastern neighbor. Clearly, the invasion rekindled memories in Finland, the Baltic States, and Central Europe (with Slovakia and Hungary as possible exceptions) of previous occupations, of incursions into their countries. In my assessment, the question of what belongs to Europe seems easier to answer now than it has been for a long time, with the proviso that one considers politics and states rather than the people living in them or their cultures. The western Balkan countries and Georgia are included, although still with some reservations. In the idea of Europe, Ukraine is definitely included. It is no longer an either/or question whether Ukraine is more Russian or European; instead, in the conception of Europe after 24 February 2022, Ukraine belongs to Europe.
According to Jaspers and Ortega y Gasset, the idea of Europe implies the necessity of overcoming national borders by offering narratives of a common past and promises of a brighter future. Both illustrate common paths in Europe's intellectual history. Early on, Europe was associated with Christianity, a shared civilization, and a common history. More future-oriented, the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) sent messages to the public, claiming to be creating a new Europe and lasting peace. After the Napoleonic Wars, concerns about the consequences of accumulated debt and lost trade routes, as well as the loss of American colonies, prompted ideas for a common European economic market, a single currency, a European central bank, and even a common European parliament. In addition, pleas for European unification were linked to perceived challenges from the United States, Russia, and from around 1900, Japan and the People's Republic of China. The successes of European integration since 1945 have been dependent on promises and longings for peace, wealth, and security. Associating Europe with historical belonging has been coupled with longings for a better future. Now, the security of Europe appears to rest on defending Ukraine. In the present understanding, the dilemma is that peace and security in Europe are only possible in combination with solidarity with Ukraine, but solidarity with Ukraine entails a sense that future is under threat with the costs of supporting Ukraine and a possible extension of the war to countries of the European Union.
The present discourse on Europe can very well be compared to the discourses in which Jaspers, Ortega y Gasset, and Derrida participated. Both nationalism and Europeanness flourished after the First World War, after the Second World War, after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, and likewise they are equally flourishing once again. Europe was, and is, considered a unity, but is also divided by national borders and the shifting boundaries between East and West. Europeanness and national sentiments emerged—at times in confrontations, at times in collaborations, and finally motivated by the hope of representing a rational synthesis, as in present political discourses. However, the context of Europeanness is dramatically different today than in 1914. Since then, one new sovereign nation-state emerged on average every fifth year. Of the present European Union Member States, only eight of them existed in 1914, and when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, nine of the present members were not sovereign states. With a Europe divided into manifold minor and medium-sized countries, the logic of integration now has a stronger grip on the mind of the Europeans. Against the backdrop of the current political discourse, Europe has broad and robust institutional integration, so no Member States could actually leave the European Union without a serious deterioration in their economic and security conditions.
As in previous defining moments in Europe's modern history, there are critical disputes over what Europe should be like and with what guiding ideas it should approach the future. Once again, Europeans are in a moment of essential contestations over the future of Europe, although this does not imply a major risk regarding a possible dissolution of European integration. The issue at stake is what such integration will look like in the future and what political values will power it.
Derrida asked Europeans not to enclose themselves in a separate identity, nor to make one nation an example to others. Current thinking about European integration is poorly served by efforts to promote a shared history or to define a common European identity. A shared history, shared memories, and shared heritage are associated with hierarchies that define some histories as more important than others. This is why definitions of European identity by public intellectuals in Western Europe have been repeatedly criticized by Central European intellectuals. I argue that a shared history is not as important as sharing the histories of different nation states and national minorities across Europe, beyond the East/West divide and national boundaries, especially when they concern ostracism. Certainly, sharing different histories can accentuate divides and heighten tensions if not based on the prerequisite that the parties are willing to integrate into the European community, intuitively or, even better, by explicit choice. The reasons for such willingness vary depending on the state of the economy, geopolitics, security, and culture. Instead of offering one single history for Europeans to gather around, I would argue that the different histories shared across borders can nurture sympathy and even solidarity. In fact, in the twenty-first century Europe, the senses of belonging to a European community are different in the various parts of the union as well as within the member states. Thus, learning about the others is to build on what already is at hand.
Ortega y Gasset, like many Europeanists after the Second World War, was critical of the concept of national sovereignty, arguing that it never existed. Currently, the meaning of sovereignty is again in dispute. The states bordering the Russian Federation are eager to defend their sovereignty by standing up to their former overlord, unwilling to return to past dependence and subordination. To do this they need solidarity with neighboring states, which was a major reason for their joining the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For them, the threat is not just in the present but has a history whose effects are expected to persist into the future. At the same time, nationalists, building on citizens' growing dissatisfaction, use the concept of sovereignty to confront the European Union and make the case against integration, even for leaving the Union. As it would be extremely hard for any Member State to build a better life for its citizens outside the Union, demands for exiting the Union are unsuccessful. If the United Kingdom, being the world's sixth-largest economy, cannot succeed on its own, it seems highly unlikely that others will follow the Brexit example. Still, as unrealistic visions have come true before, the idea of sovereignty must not be relinquished to nationalists. Just as responsible humans know that life is about connecting to others, building relationships, seeing and being seen by others, and interacting with partners, so too should Europeans learn from their history.
Over the last two decades, both greater Europeanness and greater contestation over what Europe should be like have entered public dialogue. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has strengthened a perception of Europeanness, yet it should not determine what Europe should be like. Europeans must choose what they consider to be key concepts. European solidarity needs to be given concrete meaning by and for Europeans. The question is what implications European solidarity should have for the welfare of individuals and for their opportunities to decide for themselves how to conduct their lives. European solidarity is currently critical for acting together against common enemies and threats. I consider it to be critical for ensuring that Member States will not take unilateral action, arguing that others should do more or that they have already done enough. Thinking about Europe after 24 February 2022 should also include solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainians (displaced or living in Ukraine), as well as with the Member States from Finland in the north to Romania in the south that form the European Union's frontiers against Russia. Their experience of occupation and oppression highlights, to the Western members of the European Union, in my opinion, the requirement of the duty of solidarity.
The present context for reflecting on the idea of Europe cannot remain blind to the nationalistic drift in Europe that could very well lead to new borders within Europe and to radical changes in the direction the European Union is taking. Currently, nationalistic movements in power are shifting democracies toward authoritarian rule, although this is not necessarily associated with anti-Europeanness. Victor Orban's sixteen years in power in Hungary proves the point. He professed allegiance to European values, albeit claiming that theirs differ from those of the European Union. What nationalists have in common is the emphasis on national sovereignty as the right to make decisions on their own, even if violating European law. Their argument is in direct opposition to the basic idea behind the post-war integration of Europe, namely that the Member States need to give up some of their sovereignty to gain the advantages of membership in the Union. Pleas to take back control pose a challenge to the idea of responsibility across borders.
