Introduction

This essay addresses the question whether nuclear weapons ought to fall under the exclusive competence of a supranational authority. The argument in favor of supranationalization implies their non-abolition and must therefore also offer reasons against the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their further development. Supranationalization also engenders new risks. I evaluate these risks and argue that it is nevertheless the best long-term solution compared to its alternatives.

It is not my intention to reiterate here the history of thought on nuclear weapons by notable thinkers such as Karl Jaspers, Bertrand Russell, Denis de Rougemont, and many others in the way, as for example, Mats Andrén has recently done.1 Nor do I consider psychological aspects of the development and use of nuclear weapons. Yet I will touch upon some doxastic conditions that should not be confused with psychology.

Supranationalization, as I understand it, consists only of a sectorial upscaling of governance, in this case, the one of nuclear weapons governance. The idea is not to create a comprehensive world government, as has been urged by many in the context of nuclear weapons debates, notably by Russell, among others, who argued in favor of

a unification of the world under a single government possessing a monopoly of all the major weapons of war.2

Even if a world government would have been considered the normative end of the history of political institution-building, a world state based on the rule of law and basic freedoms will not be created at once simply by inference of its necessity given the existence of the atomic bomb. If it is constituted at all, it will most likely be done by incremental sectorial integration. As I have argued elsewhere, governance at the global level must be limited to a federation in the Kantian sense, brought about by an extra-political, civilizational process.3 This was also an idea Jaspers entertained in his 1958 book Die Atombombe und die Zukunft der Menschheit, but obviously, much more would have to be said on this topic to do it justice.

The hypothesis that it is in every political community’s long-term interest and that morality requires to supranationalize nuclear weapons takes its inspiration from the "Schuman Plan Declaration" delivered on May 9, 1950. French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed, and in 1951 executed, the supra-nationalization of European coal and steel after WWII under a High Authority in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This was done to deprive the states of the basic means to prepare and launch a new war against each other, no matter what other measures they would take. It was the foundation and basis of the creation of trust for the subsequent European integration. This European example can be used to argue that goodwill efforts can de-escalate war tensions, however, it is self-evident that the supra-nationalization of nuclear weapons capacity despite its higher degree of complexity, nonetheless can be incentivized and reasonably expected to be realized in the practice of international relations in future history. For instance, in 1947 Denis de Rougemont takes the fact that humanity is risking nuclear self-destruction as a rationale to unify it. He writes,

I aver that the Bomb can save us in two ways: either by blowing up everything or by forcing us shortly to unite humanity above and beyond nations.4

Arguments in Favor of Nuclear Weapons

Let me start by briefly going through the main general arguments in favor of the continued production of nuclear weapons. When doing so, I have only strategic and not tactical nuclear weapons on the radar, as some arguments regarding massive destruction and strategic deterrence only apply to strategic nuclear weapons. A study conducted by Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda suggests that tactical nuclear weapons would require a separate analysis altogether since they are not weapons of mass destruction with strategic deterrence capability.5 Rather they can be used with a limited radius of destruction in a targeted manner. Although they have never been used in a theater of war, it is known that their use would leave long-term residual radioactive radiation.

There are two different types of arguments in favor of having strategic nuclear weapons. Arguments of the first type claim that such weapons keep peace among nuclear powers. Since peace is a classic public good, I call them public-good-oriented arguments. Second, some arguments highlight the advantages of nuclear weapons for the state possessing them. I call them private-good-oriented arguments.

Public-good-oriented Arguments

There are five core arguments in favor of nuclear weapons that are generally recognized:

1. The concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) suggests that the existence of nuclear weapons systems with second-strike capability prevents any one of the countries who possess them from using them, as this would lead to destruction on all sides.
2. The presence of nuclear weapons prevents large-scale conventional wars between nuclear-armed states. The risk of escalation toward nuclear conflict acts as a deterrent.
3. Nuclear weapons can create a strategic balance of power among unequally powerful states with nuclear weapons. They deter powerful states from attacking less powerful states that possess nuclear weapons.
4. Nuclear weapons could be used to defend humanity against extra-terrestrial threats, such as asteroids.
5. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been moderate so far. For example, at the time of Joseph Nye's 1986 book, Nuclear Ethics, there were eight nuclear weapons states (United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France, China, India, South Africa, and possibly Israel) and today, roughly forty years later there are nine nuclear states (North Korea and Pakistan were added to the count, and South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapons program). As Nye pointed out later, President Kennedy's 1963 prediction that there would be twenty nuclear powers ten years later has not come true.6

Private-good-oriented Argument

The most commonly held private position in favor of nuclear weapons is the claim that nuclear weapons can provide a country with significant political leverage on the global stage, potentially leading to greater influence in international relations.

Moral and Prudential Arguments
Against Nuclear Weapons

Despite argumentative efforts against the further development and deployment of lethal weapons, the arms industry receives massive financial support to continue with their production. Here are the four most prevalent arguments against this effort:

1. The use of nuclear weapons on Planet Earth would result in catastrophic loss of life, destruction of cultural heritage, and long-term environmental damage. Given the destructive potential of nuclear armament of the superpowers, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which a consequentialist moral or prudential military reasoning could justify the use of nuclear weapons.
2. The use of nuclear weapons on Planet Earth and the threat with nuclear weapons are immoral from a deontological point of view due to the characteristics of indiscriminate, general destruction of innocent bystanders and cultural heritage.
3. The risk of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons poses a significant danger. Technical failures, miscommunication, or human error could lead to an unintended nuclear catastrophe.
4. The spread of nuclear weapons technology to further countries increases the risk of nuclear conflict and makes global security ever more precarious.

Analysis

Much needs to be considered regarding these arguments. While one cannot do justice to all the facets, I will show that there are reasons to reject the public-good-oriented arguments when adopting a longer-term, forward-looking perspective. This holds true, even if one does not consider nuclear weapons to be morally impermissible. My reasons to reject arguments i-iii are based on forward-looking risk assessments and on the assertion of a duty of care in the face of the undesirability of total elimination of nuclear weapons capacity based on argument iv and the impossibility of complete risk avoidance.

The morally paradoxical nature of military deterrence has been discussed broadly. Likewise, nuclear deterrence carries its own moral paradoxes. In brief, the moral paradox of nuclear deterrence occurs because a deterring actor is prepared to threaten with and sincerely intends to commit indiscriminate mass killing—which is regarded as being immoral and in violation of the principles of the laws of war—precisely to avoid mass killing. This moral paradox hinges on the normative assumption stated in the wrongful intentions principle that not only is mass killing immoral, but it is also wrong to intend, threaten, or risk doing such an act. Without this principle, the paradox would not occur. Next, I will present some thoughts without going into details regarding this principle.

Intending to do x and doing x are two different and asymmetrical actions. If I plan to do x, I have not thereby done x, but if I consciously do x, I have thereby also intended to do x. It is possible that both actions (intending to do x; doing x) are morally wrong, but this does not mean that they are the same action and morally wrong in the same way. The paradox is therefore not obvious in so far as it hinges on the wrongful intention principle even if one assumes that mass killing is morally wrong. Another way to avoid the moral paradox is a consequentialist justification of mass killing by a nuclear strike, as ordered by President Harry Truman in WWII. Even if one assumes that Truman got the counterfactual numbers wrong, which is hard to prove, this does not mean that consequentialist justifications of nuclear deterrence and strikes cannot be consistent. However, this only applies to scenarios in which the other side cannot respond with nuclear weapons. It does not apply to a situation of MAD.

When considering the arguments in favor of nuclear weapons, a doxastic usability paradox can also be pointed out. It runs as follows: Consider an agent believing in a crystal-ball effect as introduced by Nye,7 that is, believing in the continued non-use of nuclear and conventional weapons between nuclear powers with second-strike capability. Let us further assume that this belief is taken as a sufficient reason to produce nuclear arms by these powers (as outlined above in section i). However, for the crystal-ball effect to be efficient, each side needs to make the other side believe that it will use nuclear arms if attacked either conventionally or with nuclear weapons. The belief that nuclear weapons are brought into existence because they establish deterrence and will hence not be used by any actor depends on all actors' belief of being prepared to use them.

In a second scenario, nuclear weapons are produced as deterrents threatening a second strike only in response to a nuclear first strike. That means they are meant to be never used in a first strike by all sides, implying that they will not be used fighting against conventional attack. To be an effective deterrent in this sense, both sides need to believe that regardless of precise circumstances the other side will not strike first using nuclear arms. Both sides are prepared to strike back only if attacked by nuclear weapons and need the other side to believe that they will indeed do so. In this argument, the doxastic usability paradox goes away: the belief that nuclear weapons will not be used in a first strike does not depend on the belief that all sides are prepared to use nuclear weapons in a first strike. Yet in this second scenario, two problems arise. First, if both sides are being prepared to never strike first with nuclear weapons and believe that the other side will not strike first, that is, if it is assumed that countries are not prepared to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against an enemy in a conventional war and that they expect all others to do the same, Nye's crystal-ball effect does not materialize for reasons inherent to the model. A country could then rationally engage in a conventional war even against a nuclear power without the fear of nuclear escalation. A recent example of a nuclear power engaging a non-nuclear power with conventional weapons is the 2022 escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Polina Sinovets and Adérito Vicente discuss the paradoxical situation of this war conflict between a nuclear power and a non-nuclear state.8 No crystal-ball effect can be claimed in this conflict. Second, provided both sides are prepared to never strike first with nuclear weapons and believe that the other side will not strike first, the first- and second-strike capabilities become obsolete and represent an unnecessary risk. In that case, it is preferable for all stakeholders to destroy or supranationalize nuclear weapons.

Let me expand a bit more on this. Ceteris paribus, the public-good-oriented deterrence-by-MAD argument, if adequate, could be an argument in favor of slow nuclear weapons and second-strike capability spreading, as has been considered by Kenneth Waltz.9 If nuclear powers have an extremely high threshold to go to war against each other it would be desirable that all states had nuclear first- and second-strike capability. The crystal-ball effect would deter all from war. This also gives an interesting invisible-hand twist to the private good-oriented argument (as stated above in section ii) in favor of nuclear weapons. The morally questionable rationale that nuclear weapons and especially second-strike capability give a given country significant political leverage to pursue its own interests on the global stage would likely lead to the collectively positive outcome of a general absence of war due to MAD of all against all. Thomas Hobbes' argument that without the assurance of a sovereign, the potential of the weakest force to kill the strongest one and the subsequent resulting threat of conflict by all against all would be transformed into the assurance of MAD by all for all, that is, a state of peace without a sovereign, provided that all actors are capable of reasoning and none of the actors is put into existential demise. This idea has been entertained by Gregory Kavka who concludes that this situation of general peace would only hold once all states on earth have reached a state of MAD of all against all. Kavka does not provide a theory about how states get to such a point, however, he argues that the pursuit of this goal by all incurs the risk of destruction, that is, a nuclear arms race and a series of wars to prevent others from getting MAD capability, and so on. Kavka writes:

Now in a world of nuclear proliferation, major and minor nuclear powers are likely to be unequal in the crucial capacity to non-suicidally kill other nuclear powers. Major powers will likely possess a first-strike capacity against (most) minor nuclear powers; that is, the ability to disarm or destroy the other power with a coordinated surprise first-strike without suffering unacceptable retaliatory damage. But minor nuclear powers will surely not have a reciprocal ability to non-suicidally attack major nuclear powers, since the latter will possess a second-strike capacity (i.e., an ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage if struck first) against them (and against many or all major nuclear powers as well). This means that even in the proliferated nuclear world there is not effective equality among nations, nor are there the same general rational incentives for nations to attack one another as there are for individuals to attack one another in Hobbes's state of nature.10

Furthermore, increased numbers of states with nuclear weapons capabilities also increase iterations of conflict situations and thereby also the risk of accidental use and of a misunderstanding, as well as the risk that some states holding nuclear weapons will be or will transform into irrational actors. There is thus a relatively clear argument for a risk-based refutation of the desirability of proliferation.

More points can be added. The refutation represents an argument against the public good-oriented argument in favor of nuclear weapons. An increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons capacity increases the risk of nuclear war too. While nuclear weapons may serve as a deterrent and provide strategic advantages for a certain period, in a longer-term perspective catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences due to accidental or irrational use may become more probable. Granted, the Bayesian pro tanto probability of an event of failure occurring does not increase simply due to time. Hence, new evidence is needed to support the thesis of increased probability of the event pro tanto. If there is a 5% chance (p) of getting hit by a car (failure) every time I cross the street on my way to the office, and if the contextual conditions remain the same, my pro tanto risk will not be different every time I go to work. But one can argue that the pro toto probability of no accident decreases with the number of iterations (n) by (1-p)n. The increase in the number of countries holding nuclear weapons, even if occurring very slowly, increases the number of iterations of situations of conflict. Both aspects taken together show that from the point of view of humanity through time (that is, pro toto), the risk of nuclear war will constantly increase unless fundamental measures are taken.

The pro toto probability formula (1-p)n together with the assumption of a lifespan of one thousand years could mean that I should stop going to the office. One might thus criticize the pro toto perspective as casting a light over things in which all risks, small and large, become larger and larger and in the end unacceptable. The increase in iterations over time transforms every low probability into a high probability, which is nonsense. Two remarks on this: Firstly, probability is not risk. Risk (R) is probability (p) multiplied by the gravity or severity of a failure or of negative impact G: R = pG. The severity increases with the increased capacity of destruction of nuclear weapons. Secondly, one needs to be consistent about the level of analysis. From the point of view of the human species, the risk of me getting hit by a car will get a relatively low severity score within consequentialist reasoning. Yet in contractualist reasoning, a certain level of risk imposition by traffic is justifiable to me given the risks involved if traffic stops altogether. Furthermore, no individual will live long enough to bring the risk level of some ordinary actions to unacceptable levels, caution and slow improvement of security are available options. However, this is different for atomic war, which has a very high severity score for the human species and for every individual as well. The human species is a series of generations of humans, which in principle have no intrinsic cut-off point to their reproduction. Extrinsically this is a contingent matter, but at least it is not irrational to assume and to hope for forward-looking durations levels for humanity of several tens of thousands of years. This leads to the rational assumption of a very high number of iterations of conflict situations looking ahead. Take the widely reported incident of September 26, 1983, when Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant-coronel of the Soviet Air Defense service ignored an early warning signal regarding an intercontinental ballistic missile attack by the United States, suspecting that it was a false alarm. He was right, no missile arrived indeed. Similar close calls involving false early warning computer signals are also on record in the United States.11 It is quite clear that with an increase in iterations of incidents of false alarm or miscommunication, the risk that somebody in the loop will not have the correct intuitions increases, as shown in the formula. From the diachronic point of view of humanity, it is thus reasonable to envision fundamental changes to the risk structure of nuclear armament by fulfilling adequate duties of care.

The Duty of Care to Minimize the Risk
of Nuclear War

Given the high probability that serious security lapses as outlined above will continue to occur, two questions need to be considered: Is the risk induced by nuclear weapons totally unacceptable to the point where risk management should be replaced by total prohibition and elimination? If yes, can nuclear weapons be put out of existence? I assume that the answer to the latter is negative, but it appears to be reasonable to differentiate the modes of existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can exist in the form of armed nuclear warheads ready to be launched. Alternatively, they can exist as disarmed and stored nuclear warheads. Furthermore, they can exist in the heads and documents of the people who keep the technological knowledge to produce and launch them. Several successful nuclear treaties in the past have decreased the number of armed nuclear warheads, but the countries were free to increase the number of disarmed nuclear warheads to a certain extent, which they did.12 This suggests that, in principle, at least the countries are prepared to reduce at least armed nuclear warheads, which corresponds to the most lethal part of nuclear armament.

My answer to the first question is that the risk implied in the existence of nuclear weapons is not totally unacceptable. Departing from this assumption, I argue that duties of care to minimize the risk of nuclear war are justifiable and necessary, as opposed to a total and general prohibition of nuclear arms. If one goes for a walk with a potentially dangerous dog, one is under a duty of care to keep it on a leash and make it wear a dog muzzle. The fulfillment of the duty of care makes one's risk imposition on others acceptable. In this example, one has done everything that can arguably be expected in order to minimize the risk of harm. But this permission depends on the assumption that owning a dog and taking it for a walk is something that is in principle permissible. The earlier stated argument iv implies the assumption that nuclear weapons can potentially save humanity from asteroids. For the sake of the argument, I will assume this assumption is true. Developing and entertaining nuclear weapons capacity for this purpose is in principle permissible. I, therefore, argue that the conception of a duty of care regarding nuclear arms can be reasonably defended against the thesis of total abolition.

What does the duty of care require in the context of nuclear weapons? I shall consider two options that go beyond the status quo. (1) The duty of every actor includes: (a) to keep only a small number of nuclear warheads; (b) to keep all warheads disarmed and stored; (c) to accept verification of these two measures by third parties. This solution is roughly the one defended by Kavka.13 (2) Additional duties include: (d) The duty of every actor to put all warheads, enrichment of uranium to nuclear weapons capacity, and all research and development of nuclear weapons under a supranational authority that is accountable to an international organization. The latter is set up to control the agency and aids the community of states at large; (e) the duty of the supranational authority to only hold disarmed and stored nuclear warheads; (f) the duty of the supranational authority to only arm nuclear warheads for tests in outer space. (g) the duty of the supranational authority to accept verification and oversight of all its activities by an independent oversight body.

Arguments Against the Duty of Care (Supranationalization)

First, a supranational authority would arguably not be beyond suspicion regarding the misuse of nuclear weapons capacity. The horror scenario would be that it abuses its monopoly of nuclear power in the absence of an alternative nuclear power to deter it from doing so. This is where the Kantian idea of a federation of republics as opposed to a world government becomes important. The supranational atomic weapons authority would be a sectorial governance institution with limited competencies and resources. It would be checked and managed by the community of states and their personnel and by other multilateral institutions, not a single world government that unifies all governmental powers. The checks and balances holding the actions of the supranational nuclear authority accountable would be much stronger than is the case for the existing individual nuclear powers and their treaty system. Also, the fact that the duties of care d-g imply the duties a-c would mean that the supranational authority only disposes of stored nuclear warheads. It may periodically test nuclear weapons in space against asteroids. This considerably reduces the risk of rapid and uncontrolled use of nuclear arms. It decreases risk when compared with a solution that only applies duty of care (a) through (c).

Second, the clear downside of supranationalization would be to end nuclear deterrence of conventional war, thereby making full-scale conventional war among what are now still formidable military powers possible again. The crystal ball effect would be lost. This is a serious counterargument. Supranationalization of nuclear weapons would mean that the most potent conventional weapons will remain in the hands of nation-states, which increases the risk of war among them when they no longer see the crystal ball that is foretelling the nuclear disaster. There are thus downsides to the supra-nationalization of nuclear weapons regarding the dissuasion of conventional international wars.

Here are some thoughts. The counterargument implies five predictive assumptions. First, nuclear weapons will continue to make it possible to avoid conventional wars among the existing superpowers in the future. Second, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be extremely slow or come to a halt. Third, armed nuclear weapons will not be launched accidentally or by misunderstanding. Fourth, the government of none of the existing nuclear powers will transform into an irrational, suicidal actor. Fifth, the destructive effect of a series of future conventional wars among superpowers will be as bad as a single nuclear war. The first predictive assertion is quite strong given the total absence of direct conventional war between the existing nuclear powers since 1945. The second predictive assertion is less strong and loses strength over time. An arguably slower-than-expected proliferation is still an increase over time, as shown above. The third predictive assertion loses probability with duration that is with an increase of risky iterations as discussed above. The fourth predictive assumption is difficult to assess, but again time and an increased number of iterations of situations of risk will weaken this prediction. The fifth assumption is correct. The two world wars among several superpowers were a total humanitarian disaster. A conventional third world war should be avoided with all possible means and not be a cost incurred in favor of avoiding a potential nuclear war. The question is whether supranationalization indeed incurs such a cost.

Since the conditions of supranationalization merit some attention, I briefly revisit the basic idea of the Schuman Plan. Schuman writes:

It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.14

Granted, the world could use a global Schuman plan that makes conventional war materially impossible; the supranationalization of nuclear weapons does not come close to such a project. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not come close to the Schuman plan either, because it allows the nuclear powers to deploy armed nuclear warheads and to entertain their own production of nuclear weapons. It is an organization for civil use of nuclear power, of oversight of non-nuclear powers, of anti-proliferation, and of some trust-building measures for the nuclear powers. The new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) prescribes the total abolition of the development, testing, and deploying of nuclear weapons by any actor. If all states were to sign the TPNW supranationalization would become superfluous. However, the total abolition of nuclear weapons capacity incurs the risk of leaving humanity defenseless against asteroids in the future. As the Schumann plan shows, supranationalization, besides being a normative achievement, is a complimentary trust-building structure with civilizing implications. It endorses Kant's and Jaspers' idea of extra-political, civilizational progress. I thus submit the hypothesis that with supranationalization, if it indeed happens, the risk of war would not necessarily fall back to a pre-WWI situation, as Nye's crystal ball argument would hold. It would be the expression of a civilizational progress in the relation of the world's superpowers.

Given the constellation of arguments provided so far, argument iv in favor of nuclear weapons can be accommodated within the supranationalization solution. The latter reduces the risk of nuclear war under a duty of care.

Nuclear weapons know-how and the drive to develop the corresponding technology will not just disappear. It is therefore not possible to simply prohibit nuclear weapons by classic internationalism. Supranationalization can accommodate this objection for it does not pretend that nuclear weapons and the know-how to produce them will simply disappear by itself. Supranationalization can also accommodate the argument that the destructive force of nuclear weapons might one day save humanity against an asteroid that threatens the planet. Hence, over time, a cautiously orchestrated supranationalization is arguably the best option for humanity to live with nuclear weapons.